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Chapter 15 
 
Urban Road User Charging and  
Workplace Parking Levies 
 
Peter Bonsall and Dave Milne 
 
 
Introduction  
 
In this chapter we will briefly describe the provision made for the introduction 
of road user charging and workplace parking levies in the Transport Act 2000 
and equivalent legislation for London and Scotland. After reviewing the 
background to these provisions, we will discuss the practical issues and policy 
questions which arise for any local authority wishing to take advantage of their 
new powers. Our discussion will draw attention to developments that have 
occurred since the passing of the Act and conclude on the prospects for 
charging schemes in the UK.  
 
 
The UK Situation 
 
Background to Charging for Road Use in the UK 
 
Although the UK had a network of toll roads in the eighteenth century, the 
current interest in road charging is generally dated to publication of the Smeed 
Report (HMSO, 1964)
 
in the 1960s. One legacy of the Smeed Report is a 
comprehensive set of criteria for the design and evaluation of charging 
schemes which, with minor amendment, are still relevant today (Milne et al., 
2000). The other legacy from the Smeed Report has been a periodic recurrence 
of interest in the potential role of road charges in the solution of congestion 
problems in cities such as London. Road user charging has been considered for 
London several times since the 1960s but on each occasion, the idea was 
abandoned in the light of perceived practical and political problems. The 
London congestion charging research programme (MVA, 1995), concluded 
that, although charging the capital’s road users was a good idea in principle, it 
would be wise to begin with trials in smaller urban areas. The report took a 
cautious view of available technology, suggesting that full implementation of 
sophisticated electronic charges at the scale that would be necessary in a major 
UK city was still some way off. Meanwhile, studies in Cambridge (Blythe and 
Hills, 1994), Leeds (Ghali et al., 2000), Edinburgh and Leicester (Ingrey and 
Fouracre, 1999) sought to explore driver responses to a variety of charging 
schemes and to quantify the potential benefits. Results from these studies 
contributed to a lively debate on the role of congestion charging as a 
component of transport policy. The government promoted this debate as part 
of a wider consultation process which led, in 1998, to the White Paper (A New 
Deal for Transport (DETR, 1998a)).  
The White Paper saw charging as part of a radical but balanced approach 
which, through consensus, cooperation and integration, could induce a mode 
shift and help solve some of the ingrained problems of transport in the UK (see 
Bonsall, 2000). A detailed consultation paper (Breaking the Logjam (DETR, 
1998ab)), specifically devoted to charging issues, proposed primary legislation 
to give local traffic authorities new powers to charge for road use in two ways: 
1. Road User Charging, allowing authorities to impose direct charges on 
drivers using roads within their area; and 
2. Workplace Parking Levies, allowing authorities to levy charges on 
employers in their area according to the number of parking spaces 
they provide for their employees. 
The inclusion of parking space charges was designed to accommodate 
those local authorities who wished to control demand for road travel to city 
centres but who had indicated, during the consultation processes, that they did 
not consider road user charging to be an appropriate solution for their locality. 
It had long been thought that demand for road travel could be influenced via 
the price of parking but, although local authorities could influence the price of 
on-street parking and public off-street parking, they had no control over the 
price of private non-residential parking (which often comprises up to 50% of 
total parking capacity in UK city centres). The power to influence the price of 
employee parking was therefore seen by some as closing a loophole. The 
possibility of levies being extended later to cover other categories of parking 
was also discussed. 
 
The Legislation 
 
Provisions for both charging approaches were included in the 2000 Transport 
Act (for England and Wales). Specific legislation was also passed for London, 
in the 1999 Greater London Authority Act, and Scotland, in the 2001 
Transport (Scotland) Act. 
In addition to giving local authorities the power to introduce road user 
charging and workplace parking levies, the 2000 Transport Act stipulates that 
schemes starting within 10 years of the commencement of the powers will have 
100 per cent hypothecation of revenue to local transport improvements, 
including public transport, for at least 10 years.  All proposals for charging and 
expenditure need specific approval by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of 
State has the power to introduce road user charges on trunk roads, bridges and 
tunnels that are considered complementary to a local authority scheme. 
The 1999 Greater London Authority Act provides similar powers to the 
mayor (and, potentially, to individual London boroughs), throughout the 
Greater London area. It stipulates that net revenues proceeds can only be spent 
on measures which, directly or indirectly, facilitate some part of the mayor’s 
transport strategy. Any proposals need the specific approval of the Secretary of 
State.  
The 2001 Transport (Scotland) Act gives local authorities the power to 
introduce road user charging, but makes no mention of workplace parking 
levies. Revenues are fully hypothecated for ‘directly or indirectly facilitating 
the achievement of policies in the authority’s local transport strategy’. Power 
to approve individual proposals falls to the Scottish ministers. 
In all cases, the Secretary of State (or the Scottish ministers) can make 
regulations requiring exemptions or reduced rates of charge for particular 
groups. It is implied that appropriate authorities may put forward proposals for 
charging schemes at any time, but that consistency with ongoing formal local 
(and national) transport policy processes and goals must be demonstrated.  
Although not covered directly by legislation, assurances were given that 
revenues from charging would be additional to, rather than a replacement for, 
existing funding for transport from central government (the so called 
‘additionality principle’). Government also committed itself to providing funds 
for research, technology trials and, potentially, direct assistance towards the 
establishment of charging schemes. 
A key feature of all the legislation is the focus on local government 
organisations as the main actors responsible for proposing and implementing 
charging schemes. Central government involvement has been constrained 
(formally) to approving local proposals and (informally) to supporting them 
through pump-priming activities and advice from appointed experts. This 
allowed central government to avoid direct responsibility for the introduction 
of schemes and, by offering local authorities the prospect of access to an 
additional and much needed source of revenue, provided clear incentives for 
cities to come forward with charging proposals.  
 
Subsequent Developments 
 
Initially, it was expected that several cities would take advantage of the 
legislation relatively quickly. Edinburgh, Bristol, Leicester and Cambridge had 
been developing road user charging proposals for a number of years, and were 
actively involved in related research studies. London, Leeds and a number of 
other cities had commissioned research into road charging and had produced 
outline proposals for charging schemes. Against this background, one of the 
assumptions underlying the traffic forecasts associated with the Government’s 
Ten Year Plan for Transport (DETR, 2000) was that 21 charging schemes (9 
road charging schemes and 12 workplace parking levy schemes) would have 
been introduced by 2010.  
The key motivation for cities to press ahead with charging was that it 
seemed to offer the only means by which to raise the funds they required to 
implement their desired capital schemes (the Leeds Supertram being the 
classic example). However, when it became clear that much of the funding 
required for these capital schemes was likely to be provided by central 
government under the provisions of the Ten Year Plan, many of the front 
runners appeared to lose interest.  
London soon emerged as the only major city likely to introduce road 
charging in the foreseeable future. The London scheme (GLA, 2001) will 
require drivers to pay £5 per day to enter an 8km2 zone in central London. The 
London scheme is closely associated with the ambitions of the mayor, Ken 
Livingstone, not only for radical solutions to transport problems in the capital, 
but also for an independent revenue stream. At the time of writing, the scheme 
is due to come into force in February 2003. Bristol and Edinburgh are the only 
other major UK cities thought to be anywhere near bringing forward a firm 
plan for road user charging (a modest scheme has been introduced in Durham, 
but it amounts to little more than an access charge to an extended car park 
within the historic city core).  
Only one city, Nottingham, is pressing ahead with proposals to introduce 
a workplace parking levy but the proposed scheme is meeting significant 
opposition from local employers and some pundits are now suggesting that it 
may never actually come into effect. It seems that almost all the other 
proposals for charging schemes or parking levies have been abandoned or 
indefinitely delayed. Concerns about acceptability appear to be the main 
stumbling block. Several major cities in England were once thought to be 
close to announcing plans for road charging or workplace parking levies, but, 
with the exceptions noted above, few will now admit to the existence of any 
such plans. 
At the time of the White Paper, discussions were based on the assumption 
that the most appropriate technology for road user charging would be to equip 
vehicles with smartcard payment systems communicating with roadside or 
overhead detector/actuator units and relying on CCTV or video-based 
enforcement. Trials of this technology were proposed in Edinburgh and Leeds, 
but were subsequently delayed. The Edinburgh trial has been abandoned and 
the Leeds trial is not now expected to report before the end of 2003. 
Meanwhile, it has become clear that the authorities in London wish to begin 
their scheme before the results of these trials are analysed. Initially at least, 
there seems to be a widespread preference for less advanced technology. 
London has chosen a proven, relatively low-technology, system which uses 
CCTV cameras and Automatic Number Plate Recognition to match vehicles 
against a database of paid-up users. 
In some contrast to this, the Commission for Integrated Transport has 
proposed a satellite-based system (CfIT, 2002). Their view is that the best 
long-term solution for managing road travel demand and encouraging more 
efficient travel decisions would be a nationwide system of road user charges 
based on travel distance, whereby cars could be charged an amount 
appropriate to their usage of different categories of road at different times of 
day. This would require all vehicles to be equipped with on-board units using 
satellites to determine their current location and, thus, the distance travelled in 
a particular charge zone. The technology would be similar to that needed for a 
new distance-based tax to replace Vehicle Excise Duty for heavy goods 
vehicles which was proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his April 
2002 budget and which is expected to be implemented by 2006.  
 
From Theory to Practice 
 
The Theory  
 
The idea that direct charges should be levied for road use originates from 
developments in welfare economics during the first half of the twentieth 
century (Pigou, 1920) and has been covered extensively in both the academic 
and policy-making literature (Maddison et al., 1996; COEC, 1995). The 
theoretical argument is that overall efficiency can only be achieved in a market 
if all participants are charged the full costs, including any externalities, of their 
activities (‘externalities’ being those impacts on other people, or society, 
which are not normally perceived or paid for – typical examples being the 
marginal contributions to congestion and environmental emissions made by 
each car in a stream of traffic). If individuals are charged for these externalities 
they can take them into account when choosing whether to use the roads – and 
each individual will use the roads only if the benefit they receive from so 
doing exceeds the full cost that such usage would impose on society.  
Externalities are particularly evident in congested traffic; each additional 
vehicle worsens the congestion and imposes more delay on the other vehicles 
in the network. Crucially, this delay is over and above that which they 
themselves suffer and hence, in the absence of a means of charging for this 
additional delay, the number of vehicles on congested roads will exceed the 
economically efficient optimum. The resulting traffic conditions are the cause 
of significant reductions in social welfare.  
Economic theory proposes that this should be resolved by imposing a 
corrective tax on each driver, equal to the difference between the perceived 
cost and the full cost. Delay is particularly prominent in congested conditions 
but other externalities, such as noise, local or global emissions and aesthetic 
intrusion, occur even when the road network is relatively uncongested. Thus it 
can be argued that drivers should pay corrective taxes for all road trips at all 
times.  
Finally, in order to provide an indication of the scale of the costs being 
considered, it is worth noting that the European Commission has estimated 
that, taken together, the cost of congestion and local environmental 
externalities is equivalent to 4.1 per cent of annual gross domestic product, as 
an average across all member states (COEC, 1995). The cost of global 
environmental externalities is uncertain and controversial but could 
significantly increase this figure. The definition of externalities may be 
obscure to most people, but the issue is not unimportant! 
 
Practice 
 
A considerable gap exists between the theory summarised above, normally 
referred to by economists as the “first-best benchmark”, and the approaches, 
normally referred to as “second-best solutions”, which can be considered in 
practice. There are three main reasons for this gap: 
x current technologies are unable to provide reliable estimates for the 
levels of externality generated; 
x drivers are unable to respond to price signals as the theory requires 
them to do – indeed some of their responses would introduce further 
costs and inefficiencies; and 
x Institutional constraints make it impossible to achieve economic 
efficiency. 
We will deal with each of these in turn. 
In the simplest systems the technology can support the imposition of 
charges on vehicles passing particular points in the network during a specified 
period of time, for example crossing a cordon around the city centre during 
peak hours. By increasing the number of charge points it is possible to 
approach a situation where drivers are charged for using those stretches of 
road which are usually congested or where additional traffic is particularly 
unwelcome (eg at bottlenecks). However, drivers’ use of these points in the 
network is a poor proxy for the generation of externalities at any given 
moment in time. Using more sophisticated technologies, which can record the 
distance travelled or the time spent within the charge area, it becomes possible 
to vary the charge so as to approximate the amount of use being made of the 
network but, again, this is not a very good proxy for the generation of 
externalities.  
Even if we had the technology with which to charge according to the value 
of externalities, this does not mean that the drivers could, or would, respond so 
as to maximise economic efficiency. In order to respond effectively, the 
drivers would need to know what the charges were before they committed 
themselves to a given pattern of behaviour. Since the generation of 
externalities varies from minute to minute and from place to place according to 
the prevailing traffic and weather conditions, the theoretically-ideal 
externality-charge is bound to change rapidly and it would be impossible for 
any driver to predict what the charges would be at any point in the network at 
any given point in time. 
It has been argued that, if non-trivial charges were to be imposed for use of 
congested links, drivers would have an incentive to become well-informed on 
the likely incidence of congestion before setting out on any journey, to keep 
themselves informed of conditions ahead, and to adjust their behaviour 
accordingly. Although a perfect match between charges and behaviour could 
never be achieved on any given day, the medium-term match might be quite 
adequate.  
The imposition of charges can, of course, have unintended effects on 
behaviour. This can obviously occur in an under-specified or incomplete 
system. For example, the imposition of a charge at a point A inside the charge 
area might cause problems if traffic is thereby diverted to an equally sensitive 
point, B, which happens to be just outside the charge area. More 
fundamentally it can occur if the driver responds to a charge which is 
proportional to distance by diverting to a shorter but more congested route, or 
if the driver responds to a charge which is proportional to travel time by 
driving more recklessly - an effect which was confirmed during research in the 
Leeds driving simulator (Bonsall and Palmer, 1997). 
Institutional constraints can make it difficult or impossible to approach the 
first-best position. There are three particular issues here. Firstly, the spatial 
extent of a scheme is in practice likely to be limited to the territorial 
jurisdiction of individual government authorities, whereas economic theory 
implies that charges should be levied universally. Secondly, the objectives of 
authorities seeking to implement charging schemes invariably embrace 
pragmatic goals such as reducing traffic levels in sensitive locations, inducing 
modal shift to public transport and raising revenues to fund desired capital 
investments. These goals have conflicting requirements and it is clear that a 
concern to maximise theoretical economic efficiency of the system will fall 
some way down the lists of priorities. Thirdly, policy-makers have a 
preference for simple charging regimes, such as fixed charges to cross a 
cordon round the city centre, which can be implemented with relatively simple 
technology. Among the attractions of simple systems are that they are based 
on well-tried technology, that they can be introduced quickly with minimal 
legal and institutional complication and that they may be easier for everyone 
involved to understand and accept.  
The ability of simple road charging systems and of workplace parking 
levies to support charges which reflect economic externalities is obviously 
limited, but they may be quite well suited to meeting the broader objectives 
described above. 
The inclusion of revenue-raising as an explicit objective of road user 
charging introduces a particular conflict between economic theory and the 
perceptions of road users and policy-makers. In the first-best case, it is 
assumed that the utility contained in the corrective taxes is returned to the 
population in ways which ensure that everyone shares the benefits without 
producing economic distortions in the transport sector. The nearest second-
best approximation to this is normally taken to be using the revenues to reduce 
general labour taxes. In practice, however, any suggestion that charges levied 
locally should be recycled nationally would face major opposition from the 
local communities involved. Indeed, the typical local perception is that 
charging would be quite unacceptable unless the revenues were hypothecated 
for improvements to the transport system in the local area. 
In the longer term, the widespread use of satellites to support in-vehicle 
systems may make this the obvious choice of technology for road user 
charging because it would obviate the requirement for roadside infrastructure 
and because quite sophisticated charging regimes may become possible using 
equipment that may be fitted as standard to the majority of new vehicles. The 
probable wider uptake of smartcard technology for electronic payment may 
also tend to increase the acceptability of more complex charging approaches. 
How far these innovations might be used to develop practical proposals for 
charging based on better estimates of externalities is an open question. On the 
one hand, promoting economically efficient charges is currently a significant 
element of transport policy in the European Community. On the other hand it 
seems (Train et al, 1989) that users prefer simple charging structures and, so 
long as the control and operation of road transport is in public hands, it is 
perhaps unlikely that policy-makers will go against this preference. 
 
Experience Elsewhere 
 
Outside the UK, it is relatively common for drivers to pay direct charges for 
using major inter-urban motorways. However, these charges are generally 
associated with the operation and maintenance of the road and are not 
designed to cover externalities or affect travel behaviour. 
In the US, Canada and Australia, payments have been introduced on a 
small number of urban motorways and the idea of using charges to control 
peak demand has been investigated. The American ‘value pricing’ trials (FHA, 
2000) are particularly interesting because they allow for the fact that although 
some users (those with high values of time) will be prepared to pay to avoid 
congestion, others will not. The concept involves the designation of one or two 
lanes of the highway as a ‘value lane’ while the other lane(s) remain untolled. 
The toll is set at a level which is just sufficient to depress demand enough to 
leave a time advantage for those using the value lane. Drivers have the option 
of paying for improved travel conditions on particular stretches of road, but 
are also still able to access their destinations for free if they are prepared to use 
the slower lanes. This approach provides interesting empirical evidence about 
the willingness to pay to avoid congestion and may go some way towards 
mitigating the impacts of externalities on users with high values of time while 
providing some protection to low income users whose values of time would 
not justify their payment of a toll. However, it departs from the pure economic 
efficiency rationale for congestion charging, which implies that all drivers 
should be affected equally. 
The best examples of direct charges for use of urban roads come from 
Singapore and the Norwegian cities of Oslo, Bergen and Trondheim. 
Singapore has, for demand management purposes, operated a charged cordon 
for entry to the central business district since 1975. Initially, this was a 
manually operated system involving the purchase of paper permits but it has 
subsequently been converted to a sophisticated electronic payment system and 
is now being expanded ultimately to cover all major routes on the island. It 
provides an excellent case study of road user charging but the unique 
geographical and political setting may reduce its usefulness as a role-model for 
the average UK city. In Norway, charge-cordons have been in place in three 
cities since 1986, using a combination of manual and electronic tag-based 
payment. The explicit aim has been to raise revenues to fund a series of major 
transport projects and, to this end, charges were designed to spread the 
financial burden as thinly as possible across the largest number of drivers 
rather than to affect travel demand. The policy-makers initially stated that the 
charges would be removed as soon as the investment costs had been 
recovered. However, subsequent growth of traffic, especially in Oslo, has led 
to this commitment being reviewed. The Norwegian experience provides 
valuable information about the practicalities of introducing direct charges for 
urban road use in a European setting. In particular, it demonstrates the political 
possibility of successfully implementing a charging policy despite very low 
levels of initial acceptability. A key factor seems to have been that revenues 
were explicitly hypothecated for popular capital investment projects and that 
central government provided a proportion of the funds up-front to enable some 
of the results of the investment to become apparent immediately before 
charges were introduced. 
The Netherlands has actively considered introducing road user charges (see 
www.roadpricing.nl). An initial proposal (Rekeningrijden), focused on the 
four major cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht, aimed to 
charge all drivers a fixed fee during the morning peak for entering a cordoned 
area around each city. The Rekeningrijden proposal met very effective 
opposition and was superseded by a new proposal (MobiMiles), involving a 
distance-based charge for all roads in the Netherlands with charge levels 
varying by vehicle type, location and time of day. Although this is, potentially, 
a more draconian approach, it initially met with less opposition. 
 
 
Implementation Issues  
 
Local authorities contemplating the implementation of road user charging 
and/or workplace parking levies will wish to consider a number of issues: the 
effect on traffic levels, the net revenue, the impact on economic activity, equity, 
practical issues and, last but by no means least, acceptability. We now discuss 
each of these issues, highlighting the extent to which the impacts are dependent 
on factors within the control of the implementing authority. 
 
Effect on Traffic Levels 
 
The impact of a road user charging scheme on road traffic will obviously 
depend primarily on the level of charge applied, the extent of the charge area 
and the number of drivers affected. This relationship will not be so clear in the 
case of a workplace parking levy for several reasons. Firstly, because 
employers may choose to absorb the levy rather than pass it on to their 
employees – in which case there would be little incentive for commuters to 
modify their travel behaviour – although some effect might be achieved if 
employers, seeking to reduce their exposure to the levy, were to reduce the 
number of parking spaces available. Secondly, even if road-space is freed up 
because the increased cost of parking persuades some commuters not to drive, 
the space might be filled by travellers unaffected by the levy. These might be  
commuters whose employers are not subject to the charge, commuters whose 
employers decide to absorb the charge or people making other types of trip. 
Thirdly, although, as intimated above, there might be some shift of trips from 
other periods in towards the peak, this might in turn be offset by increased off-
peak travel associated with trips using car parking spaces no longer required 
by commuters.  
In the case of road charging the overall impact of a scheme may be 
crucially dependent on the precise location of the charge area boundary. From 
a city-wide perspective, a looked-for reduction in congestion within the charge 
area could be outweighed by an increase in congestion on those roads just 
outside the boundary which provide alternative routes for drivers wishing to 
avoid the charge.  A major issue in the design of road user charging schemes 
will be to locate the boundary of the charge area such that there is adequate 
capacity for this traffic. The precise boundary of a workplace parking levy 
scheme would have relatively little impact on traffic patterns but could have a 
significant effect on local parking demand. 
The traffic impact of a road charging scheme can be tailored to the 
temporal pattern of congestion by careful definition of the time periods during 
which charges are to apply. In the case of workplace parking levies, however, 
even allowing for the possibility of journey retiming, any traffic reductions are 
likely to be largely restricted to the commuting periods. This may be fine if 
congestion is concentrated in those periods but not if congestion also occurs at 
other times of day.  
The impact of road user charging schemes on traffic conditions will 
depend critically on the charging regime adopted. Modelling work has 
provided some useful insights here. Work by May and Milne (2000) has 
suggested that charges based on time spent travelling are most effective in 
reducing delays, but that this may be at the expense of increases in distances 
travelled and that this effect may outweigh any reductions in traffic levels due 
to reduced trip-making. Charges based on distance travelled have been found 
to be most effective in reducing vehicle miles (see for example Hyman and 
Mayhew, 2002). They may provide some relief at congestion hot-spots due to 
reduced trip-making, but this effect may be small and congestion may actually 
increase on the shorter routes. The effect of charges to cross cordons or 
screenlines are critically dependent on the size of the charge area, the levels of 
charge applied and the precise locations of charging points (Shepherd et al, 
2001). Work by Fridstrom et al (2000) suggests that cordon-based road 
charging schemes of the kind usually proposed by policy-makers are unlikely 
to achieve much more than around 40% of the benefits predicted under 
economically optimal pricing.   
If charges are varied by time of day and are concentrated on key links in the 
network, it may be possible to focus impacts on those times and places where 
congestion is common and to avoid major effects on other travellers. There is 
clearly a theoretical argument for varying the charges from day to day and hour 
to hour depending on current levels of congestion (Oldridge, 1990). However, 
if the charging regime becomes complicated or unpredictable, drivers will be 
unable to modify their travel behaviour in the light of the charges and much of 
the theoretical benefit will be lost. There is clearly a trade-off between 
sophisticated regimes which attempt to focus charges on the times and places 
where congestion is most serious and simpler approaches which, although not 
so finely tuned to the problem, do allow drivers to predict the charges and 
respond accordingly.  
The impact of a given charge on driver behaviour is likely to depend not 
only on its level and predictability but also on the extent to which it is 
perceived as being associated with individual journeys. A charge levied per 
journey and evident at the point of use is likely to have more effect than one 
which can be paid in advance or which can buy access for an extended period 
of time. Although the initial outlay for a period-ticket will be greater, once it 
has been purchased there is every incentive for the driver to make maximum 
use of it. It has been suggested that the effect of a given charge would be 
maximised by emphasising its relationship to road use, for example by 
displaying the charge at the roadside or on an in-vehicle meter. 
 
Revenues 
 
The net revenue achievable from road user charging will be a function of the 
charge level, the costs of system installation and operation, the number of 
drivers affected and the nature of their response. All except the last of these 
are, to a greater or lesser extent, within the control of the system designers. For 
example, the number of drivers affected will be determined by the spatial 
extent of the charge area, the hours of operation and the list of exempted 
vehicles while the costs of installation and operation will be a function of the 
technology employed. Initial estimates of the amount of revenue ‘lost’ as a 
result of drivers modifying their behaviour in order to reduce their exposure to 
road charges have been based on conventional price elasticities derived in 
other contexts and from responses to road charging observed in other 
countries. However, evidence from field trials and experiments and from 
stated preference questionnaires (see for example, Bonsall et al., 1998) 
suggests that drivers will be less likely to change their behaviour in response 
to road charges than would be predicted from conventional elasticities and that 
the elasticities will vary depending on the scheme design.  
The net revenue from a workplace parking scheme will depend on the 
charge, the costs of implementation and operation, the number of eligible 
spaces and the response of employers. Although initial estimates of the costs 
of implementation and operation suggested that they might be quite modest, 
more recent studies have suggested that the costs involved in the establishment 
and maintenance of a database of commuter parking places, the collection of 
charges, the monitoring of space usage and the enforcement of restrictions, 
could be quite considerable. Prediction of employer response, or more 
specifically, of the number of commuter parking spaces which employers 
might decommission or re-designate for other purposes, is difficult because of 
the lack of precedents. Some firms will, of course, seek to reduce or avoid 
their liability to the levy by under-reporting their parking stock or, if 
exemptions are offered for firms which are below a given size or who adopt an 
approved green travel plan, by seeking to qualify for such exemptions, 
legitimately or otherwise. Such possibilities will need to be taken into account 
when forecasting revenues. The response of individual employees will only 
affect the revenue from workplace parking levies if it leads employers to 
reduce their stock of spaces. 
 
Economic Impacts 
 Road user charging can be expected to produce economic benefits through 
reduced congestion, but may also do so through appropriate use of the 
revenues. The hypothecation clauses in the Transport Acts rule out the use of 
revenues to reduce local property taxes/business rates but would permit use of 
revenues to improve environmental conditions or the provision of transport – 
either of which would be likely to make an area more attractive to investors. 
However, the distribution of benefits is likely to be very uneven; some 
locations, and some firms, will lose out relative to others.  
The mechanisms are fairly clear. Reductions in economic activity are likely 
to occur just inside the charging area – particularly if the charge is simply 
based on crossing the cordon – because the exposure to charges may not be 
offset by substantial reductions in congestion. Reductions in economic activity 
may also occur just outside the charging area if the volume of traffic seeking 
to avoid the charge results in increased local congestion and environmental 
deterioration. The net effects are difficult to predict but it seems reasonable to 
suppose that the pattern of land use will change over time and that high value 
activities for whom the charges represent a small fraction of their turnover, 
will tend to congregate within the charge area – where they can benefit from 
the reduced congestion, while low value activities will be displaced or relocate 
outside the charge area. The area just outside the charge zone is likely to 
attract car parks and housing for those wanting to be within walking distance 
of the centre. If there is a charge at a cordon, bulk retailing will tend to locate 
on whichever side of the cordon its main customer base is to be found. 
The outcome in any given city will reflect the spatial relationship between 
charges, businesses and residential areas and will be mitigated by development 
control policies. Evidence from the Norwegian cities, where charges have been 
imposed towards the perimeter of the main urban area, is that property prices 
have increased more rapidly inside than outside the cordon. This probably 
reflects the fact that the area within the cordon is of sufficient size for people 
to reside, work and travel to all the main urban activities without making a 
payment. Businesses and housing outside the cordon are cut off from their 
natural market and therefore are relatively disadvantaged. By contrast, many 
of the road user charging proposals for UK cities involve a fairly tight cordon 
around the central business district (CBD) with relatively little residential 
property inside the cordon. It may be that, unless prevented by strict 
development control, this will lead to a migration of activities with large 
customer bases to areas outside the charge area and an increasing dominance 
of business-to-business commercial activities within the CBD.  
The attractiveness of the charge area as a location in which to live may 
depend on whether outbound trips are charged in the morning and inbound 
trips are charged in the evening – if they are then city-centre living may 
become less attractive. It is by no means clear that the long term effects on 
land use patterns would be beneficial – the migration of mass activities from 
the city core could further exacerbate environmental problems and make it 
more difficult to service transport demands via public transport.  
It is difficult to be optimistic about the impacts of a workplace parking levy 
on the urban economy. Since it is unlikely that such a scheme would result in a 
significant reduction in congestion, the main economic effect will be the 
additional costs imposed on business (or their employees) offset by any 
beneficial consequences from use of the revenues. Consultation exercises in 
Nottingham and other cities which have considered introducing a workplace 
parking levy suggest that business leaders are profoundly pessimistic about the 
likely impact on their activities. A major concern for policy-makers must be 
that organisations may decide to relocate outside the charged area or, more 
seriously for the local economy, to other cities and regions. 
The legislation envisages that parking levies will not be imposed on firms 
below a certain size (it being recognised that the effort required to administer a 
system which includes the smallest firms would not be justified by the revenue 
to be derived from these smallest firms). This could distort the local economy. 
Small firms in the charge area will have a commercial advantage over their 
larger rivals in the short-term, but the natural tendency of successful firms to 
grow may be constrained by the prospect of becoming liable to the levy and so 
small firms within the charge area may be disadvantaged relative to their 
competitors outside the area.  
 
Equity 
 
Any system of road charging will produce winners and losers. Generally, 
drivers with high values of time (for example, the rich and those involved in 
business activities) may be expected to benefit from travel time savings 
which, to them, are worth more than the fee paid, while drivers with lower 
values of time may be expected to lose out – particularly if they have no 
option but to continue using the charged roadspace. In addition, where 
charges are spatially concentrated there may be major differences in the 
impact on organisations or individuals located inside and outside the charge 
area – particularly if, as noted earlier, they are located close to the boundary.  
The equity implications of variations in charge by time of day will depend 
on the nature of the activities involved. For example, high charges in the peak 
would adversely affect low income people whose work requires them to travel 
by car but does not allow any flexibility in work hours. Conversely imposition 
of charges during evenings and at weekends would adversely affect low 
income shift-workers whose work hours make use of public transport 
unrealistic.  
Provision of exemptions will have an important role to play in mitigating 
equity problems with road charging or workplace parking levies but cannot 
solve all the potential problems. We are not aware of any proposals which do 
not grant exemptions to individuals who are seriously mobility impaired but 
we are well aware that granting exemptions to those with more minor 
handicaps would raise difficult issues of comparability and, potentially, invite 
abuse. A concern for the particular problems of low/medium income workers 
led to the suggestion that ‘key workers’ should be exempt from charges in the 
London scheme but the idea was dropped when it was recognised that any 
definition of key workers could be seen as discriminatory with respect to 
individuals and the organisations employing them. 
The proposed exemption of small firms from workplace parking levies 
could be regarded as discriminatory – and might lead to legal challenge – 
because it would confer a commercial disadvantage on larger firms and a 
penalty on their employees. Furthermore, since public sector organisations are 
likely to have less freedom to absorb the levy, they are more likely than 
private sector organisations to pass it on to their employees. This difference 
could be regarded as working to the disadvantage of public sector employees 
and may lead to objections from labour unions. 
 Decisions on location, regime, level of charging and exemptions are 
central to equity. The standard argument from economics is that those who are 
particularly negatively affected can be compensated by the revenues obtained 
from those who benefit. This is rather easier to conceive in theory than 
implement in practice, as it would be impossible to identify the full range of 
circumstances that cause each individual to be a winner or a loser, but it helps 
point to the fact that use of revenue is the main tool available for resolving 
those equity concerns which cannot be tackled via provision of exemptions. 
Recognition of the particular problems for night-shift workers led the 
organisers of the London congestion charging scheme to propose improved 
late-night bus services but concerns for their personal security have led some 
of the workers involved to dismiss this as a wholly inadequate response to 
what they see as unfair treatment. 
 
Practicality 
 
The main issues to be considered under this heading relate to the technology 
and procedures used for charging, billing and enforcement.  
The relative merits of a number of approaches, including paper permits, 
were assessed by consultants working for the Government Office for London 
on behalf of the then-yet-to-be-elected Mayor of London (GLA, 2000) and for 
Leeds (MVA et al., 1999). It was concluded that the best approach for a 
relatively small scheme would, in the early years, be to use cameras and image 
recognition technology to read the registration plates of vehicles within the 
charge area and to check each registration plate thus identified against a 
database of vehicles for which a charge had been paid for the day in question. 
Enforcement action could then be taken in respect of any vehicle for which a 
charge had not been paid. Drivers would be able to pay the charge on a daily 
basis, or for an extended period, by a variety of methods including credit card 
transactions by phone.  
A number of concerns remain over this system particularly in respect of 
errors in the image recognition technology (perhaps around 10 per cent in 
typical traffic conditions), the need for evidence of non-compliance that would 
stand up in court, and inaccuracies in the Driver and Vehicle Licensing 
Authority (DVLA) database which would be used to identify the registered 
keepers or owners of non-compliant vehicles (some estimates suggest that up 
to 20 per cent of DVLA records have errors and the figure is likely to be even 
higher for that subset of vehicles for which enforcement action is necessary). 
There is also a concern that, although the proposed London scheme covers a 
relatively small area, the sheer volume of data involved in registering 
payments, checking registrations against the database and monitoring the 
payment of fines, might outstrip the capacity of the computers. Finally, some 
database experts have suggested that computer hackers might find a way of 
bringing the system to a standstill or corrupting its content.  
Despite the efforts currently being expended in London to overcome or 
minimise these problems, there are those who doubt that the current schedule 
(with charging due to start in February 2003) allows enough time for them to 
be fully overcome. There is clearly a serious concern that the credibility of the 
London scheme could be jeopardised if the problems outlined above were to 
result in high-profile erroneous prosecutions or if the public were to come to 
believe that the risk of being prosecuted for non-payment was very small – 
either as a result of the system’s failure to identify non-compliant vehicles, or 
as a result of a low level of successful enforcement. If the system is not able to 
provide clear and incontrovertible evidence the authorities will be faced with a 
dilemma in respect of their policy on enforcement: too aggressive and they 
risk bad publicity from unsustainable prosecutions, too weak and they risk 
promoting the perception that non-compliance is unlikely to be pursued.  
As a general rule, the more complicated the charging regime, the greater 
the scope for practical problems in the installation, maintenance and operation 
of the scheme. Thus a scheme with different charges for vehicles of different 
types or using the network in different ways (for example, travelling different 
distances, taking different routes or spending different lengths of time on the 
road) may encounter more practical problems than one based on a simple 
cordon such as that proposed for London. As was noted in a previous section, 
theoretically ideal charging systems require charging regimes which 
discriminate between vehicles according to the amount and timing of their use 
of the network. This discrimination is only achievable if the vehicles’ 
whereabouts can be carefully, and almost continually, monitored. The privacy 
and practicality issues raised by any kind of external monitoring at this level of 
detail lead to the conclusion that vehicles would have to be equipped with in-
vehicle units (IVUs) which can ‘know’ where the vehicle is and how far and 
fast it is travelling.  
Any proposal to require IVUs immediately raises three very practical 
issues; Firstly, what to do about non-equipped vehicles? Experience with the 
introduction of smartcard-based tolling systems, notably in North America and 
France, suggests that it is not necessary to have all vehicles equipped provided 
that there is some way of charging non-equipped vehicles. The possibility of a 
later migration to a smartcard or IVU system was certainly taken into 
consideration before London chose to adopt its camera-and-database system. 
Secondly, how to meet the cost? Theoretically, of course, because it can 
support charges which are more closely adjusted to the value of the journey 
being made, an IVU system should be able to capture more revenue and would 
therefore justify some central contribution to the cost of the IVUs. However, 
there is evidence, again from the side-by-side operation of smartcard systems 
and manual systems, to suggest that an appropriate system of discounts could 
persuade drivers to contribute towards the costs of their own IVUs. Thirdly, 
can we be sure that IVUs would not be tampered with in order to avoid 
payments? Although some advocates of IVU-based systems express 
confidence that a tamper-proof system could be produced, others privately 
admit that it is impossible to be sure that some technical ‘geek’ would not 
succeed in the challenge of overcoming almost any security measures.  
The practical problems outlined above have all related in some way to the 
technical specification of road charging schemes. One of the reasons for the 
initially high level of interest from local authorities in workplace parking 
levies was that they did not depend on unproven technologies. This is true but 
closer examination revealed that the practical problems involved in the 
establishment and maintenance of an inventory database of workplace parking 
spaces will be far from trivial. Given the prevalence of unmarked spaces, 
labyrinthine site layouts and creative parking behaviour, establishing the 
number of spaces is something of a challenge but the real problem is how to 
determine whether a given space is an employee’s space or whether it is for 
customers or operations. Particular complications may arise where employees 
use vehicles for a mixture of commuting and business purposes. The resources 
required to complete the task will depend on cooperation from the 
organisations affected but, as Nottingham is discovering, this cooperation may 
not be forthcoming. The likelihood that firms will be actively considering how 
best to minimise their exposure to charges – by obfuscating their parking 
capacity, redefining their employees or seeking to be reclassified as a group of 
small firms below the threshold size, may make the preparation of the database 
particularly challenging. Even after the database is completed considerable 
effort is likely to be required to keep it up to date and to monitor the usage 
actually being made of spaces within the charge area. The overall impact of 
the scheme on road traffic will depend on the effectiveness of associated 
control of off-site parking. This may require expenditure of considerable effort 
on enforcement. 
 
Another group of problems, which may affect road charging schemes as 
well as workplace parking levies, arise when there is a conflict of interests 
between the authority wishing to implement the scheme and another authority 
with a legitimate interest. This may make it difficult or impossible to define an 
effective scheme. For example, if the optimum location for the boundary of the 
charge area were to cause diverting traffic to use roads administered by an 
adjacent authority, that authority might be able to convince the Secretary of 
State that the scheme should not proceed. Even if the Secretary of State 
decided not to intervene the authority might decide to pursue its objection 
through the courts. It is of course open to any aggrieved party, individual, 
company or local authority to question the legality of a proposed scheme. 
Given the strength of passions likely to be aroused it is almost inconceivable 
that such challenges will not be made. Such action could delay the 
implementation of a scheme or force a change in its design which would 
seriously compromise its effectiveness.  
In the London case, the fact that the Mayor has the power to introduce a 
road charging scheme under the provisions of the Greater London Authority 
Act (1999) does not prevent any aggrieved party from raising a legal objection 
to the way that the scheme is being introduced. Any authority intending to 
implement a charging scheme will need to take particular care not to expose 
themselves to charges of discrimination, invasion of privacy, failure to comply 
with data protection legislation, failure of fiduciary duty, or failure to consult 
fully. The current London administration, led by Ken Livingstone who was at 
the wrong end of a legal judgement on public transport fares subsidy in the 
1970s, was well aware of these issues and took great care to avoid being 
exposed in this way. Three London Boroughs (Kensington and Chelsea, 
Wandsworth and Westminster) mounted a legal challenge on the grounds that 
the Mayor had not consulted fully but their claim was rejected. Nevertheless, 
although the judge concluded that the scheme did not amount to contravention 
of human rights, the possibility of a further action on these grounds is 
threatened before February 2003. 
 
Acceptability 
 
It is important to draw a distinction between acceptance – the willingness of 
individuals to comply with a measure – and acceptability – whether or not 
they support it. Road charging is certainly controversial in the UK and dire 
predictions have been made that its implementation will conjure mass protests 
of the kind which effectively killed off Mrs Thatcher’s Community Charge. 
Reference to road charging as a ‘poll tax on wheels’ will undoubtedly cause 
some politicians to hesitate and were not lost on Ken Livingstone who will 
have recalled the public support for the ‘Can’t Pay, Won’t Pay’ campaign 
following fares increases in London in the 1980s. Some commentators have 
suggested that the decision to exempt taxis from the proposed London charge 
is not unconnected with their noted willingness to mount effective protests if 
their interests are ever threatened. Despite these worries it must be noted that 
there is no evidence from experience in either Singapore or Norway that 
failure to comply is a major problem.  
But even if there are no mass protests, the scheme is unlikely to be popular 
with motorists – particularly in the short term. Public support for Oslo’s 
charges has been rising continuously over the decade during which the scheme 
has been in operation but still is only just approaching half of the urban 
population. Support for any given road charging scheme will depend on its 
design and will reflect its perceived effectiveness, equity, practicality and 
economic impacts. Other things being equal, there is likely to be particular 
exception to schemes which seem unnecessarily complicated or which do not 
produce any obvious benefits. A major problem for those seeking to 
implement a scheme is that those who stand to gain are likely to be much less 
voluble than those who stand to lose. The trick may be to ensure that the 
gainers are more numerous than the losers – which takes us back to the issue 
of equity and the judicious use of exemptions and revenues to turn potential 
losers into actual gainers. 
In their detailed consideration of acceptability issues in transport pricing, 
Schade et al. (2000) identify three separate interest groups: the public; the 
business community; and political decision-makers. 
Individuals are likely to oppose proposals which seem to impact on them 
more than on other groups, payment structures or mechanisms which appear 
unnecessarily complex, and technologies which appear intrusive. A major 
concern, often articulated in public discussions is the fundamental unfairness 
of having to pay for road space which has traditionally been free at the point of 
use and which 'we pay for through our taxes and petrol'. There is little that a 
local authority can do to defuse this argument – though Leeds have considered 
offering reduced parking charges within the charge area and, at a national 
level, it has been suggested that any revenue from national road charges 
should be offset by reductions in Vehicle Excise Duty and fuel tax. 
The granting of exemptions may seem an obvious means of defusing 
complaints about unfair treatment, and we note that the London scheme will 
offer significant discounts to people resident within the charge area, but ill-
judged exemptions may simply enrage those who do not qualify. A scheme 
which fails to deliver the expected reductions in congestion is likely to be 
intensely unpopular even if it involves only modest charges. Hence the 
importance of ensuring that the charge is high enough to create some traffic 
reductions and that there is sufficient capacity outside the charge area 
boundary to carry the diverted traffic without causing yet more congestion. It 
is said that Ken Livingstone decided on a £5 daily charge for the London 
scheme on the grounds that ‘£3 would have been too small to have any effect 
and £10 would have led to riots’.  
The acceptance of value charging by US motorists demonstrates the 
importance of good marketing (to label the concept ‘value pricing’ was a 
stroke of genius) and of providing choice. Norway’s decision to offer drivers a 
choice between manual and electronic payment reflected the perceived need to 
avoid compulsory imposition of electronic payment technology – recalling the 
fact that trials of electronic payment for road use in Hong Kong in the 1980s 
were famously abandoned due in part to concerns that the chosen technology 
would compromise privacy.  
One impact of road charging schemes which seems not to have raised 
much concern among the public is the aesthetic impact of the associated street 
furniture – this is the sort of issue that is not perceived until it is experienced 
first hand and even then is likely to be a minority concern. 
Public acceptance of workplace parking levies will depend crucially on 
whether their employers decide to pass the charge on to those of their 
employees who drive to work. If the charges are passed on then one can expect 
considerable opposition and, although part of the opprobrium may well fall on 
the employers rather than on the authority responsible, a major issue is likely 
to be the unfairness of a policy which affects some drivers to the advantage of 
others. 
The response of the business community to a charging scheme will depend 
particularly on its perceived effectiveness and economic impacts. It seems that 
business leaders will tend to support road user charging measures if they 
believe they will be effective in reducing travel costs, but they understandably 
oppose all policies that would reduce their competitiveness in the market. The 
fact that the charges take effect immediately while the benefits may not be 
obvious until later will tend to reduce their enthusiasm for road charging but 
many large businesses express support for the concept as a necessary response 
to the problem of urban congestion – although they are mindful on the possible 
effect that a charge might have on their ability to recruit and retain staff. Their 
response to workplace parking levies is less measured – not only are they 
sceptical about the supposed traffic reduction benefits but they are enraged to 
learn that they are expected to resource the process by which the charges are 
passed on to the drivers at whom they are aimed. They are faced with an 
unwelcome dilemma – do they reduce their competitiveness by absorbing the 
levy or do they risk alienating their workforce by passing it on? 
Business leaders are, of course, particularly concerned if they believe that 
they are to be more disadvantaged than their key competitors. Those who 
operate primarily in local markets will be most concerned about equity of 
treatment within the local scheme, while those operating in wider markets will 
make comparisons with policies being adopted in other areas. It is not clear 
what can be done to increase the business community's acceptance of charging 
schemes other than by emphasising the expected reduction in congestion and 
targeting the revenues in ways that are likely to benefit the local economy – 
although the hypothecation rules clearly rule out direct assistance to business. 
Political decision-makers are likely to be concerned about all aspects of a 
charging scheme but most particularly by its acceptance by the voting public, 
its ability to generate revenue, its ability to deliver reductions in congestion 
and its impact on the local economy. Elected representatives will be very 
concerned about timing; they need to be confident that, at critical points of the 
political cycle, they will be able to point to benefits which outweigh any 
negative aspects. Given the relatively short gaps between elections in UK 
cities, this may encourage a focus on charging schemes that can rapidly deliver 
some benefits, even if there is reason to believe that other approaches might 
bring greater benefits in the longer term. This fact may indeed explain the 
greater initial interest in workplace parking levies than in road charging. 
The main concern for politicians must be the extent to which the overall 
policy is supported by the voting public. As the introduction of charging is 
unlikely to be a vote-winner on its own, the use of revenues to fund measures 
that improve acceptability may be vital. In the Norwegian case, road user 
charging has never achieved support from a majority of the public but there is 
widespread support for the major transport projects that the charging schemes 
were designed to enable. The Norwegian politicians concluded that the pain 
was well worth the gain but it takes a brave politician to introduce a charging 
scheme unless they have no alternative.  
 
Conclusion and Tangent  
 
Although direct charges for road use are, according to economic theory, the 
ideal solution to transport inefficiencies, there are, as we have seen, many 
reasons why they may be unable to produce the same benefits in practice. Not 
least of these reasons is that government is not actually seeking to maximise 
economic efficiency; their objectives include solving transport problems, 
raising revenues and promoting the local economy and they seek to achieve 
theses objectives in a manner which is equitable, practicable and acceptable to 
their electorate. The niceties of internalising the externalities and theoretical 
arguments about economic efficiency will have little bearing on their 
decisions.  
The legislation provided local authorities with the powers necessary to 
introduce schemes that could provide transport system benefits and revenues. 
The associated forecasts of potential benefits, the assurances on additionality, 
and the offer of technical assistance where needed, led several authorities to 
express an interest in introducing road charging or a workplace parking levy. 
This initial interest in turn led the government to build into their Ten Year Plan 
the assumption that 21 cities would have charging schemes in place by 2010. 
This target now looks unachievable. At the time of writing, no city other than 
London and Durham has come forward with firm plans for road charging and 
Nottingham now seems alone its intention to implement a workplace parking 
levy.  
The reason for the decline in interest is not hard to find. Firstly, for local 
authorities in England and Wales, the generous provision of funds under the 
Ten Year Plan for Transport has removed what was the most immediate reason 
for introducing charges - namely to raise revenues. Secondly, following the 
emergence of a very vocal motoring lobby and the successful campaign 
against fuel tax, government at all levels is keen to avoid being cast as anti-car 
(see Parkhurst, 2002).  
Although the legislation was passed by central government, it was always 
going to be up to local government to take the initiative and responsibility for 
charging schemes in their area. Given the shift in stance of central government 
away from charging and the departure from the transport policy arena of John 
Prescott (the architect of the 2000 Act), local authorities which might have had 
an interest in introducing charges now feel rather exposed and are by no means 
convinced that central government would provide political support when times 
get hard. 
In the medium term, a delay in the implementation of road charging may 
not matter to the cities who were expected to be in the vanguard because they 
can be getting on with spending their Ten Year Plan money while waiting to 
see whether the London scheme succeeds. In the longer term however, the 
absence of the expected revenue stream from road charging and parking levies, 
may leave the Ten Year Plan financially unsustainable and the absence of 
traffic restraint may make its targets for modal split and traffic reduction 
unachievable. 
We have indicated some scepticism about the ability of workplace parking 
levies to have much impact on general traffic levels – suggesting that their main 
role may be in raising revenue for other transport schemes. We are not alone in 
suggesting that they are likely to be difficult and unpopular to implement and 
that their impacts on land use patterns may be detrimental. Ironically perhaps, 
the problem seems to be that they are limited in their scope; if levies were 
applied to all parking spaces, irrespective of location or type, there would be 
some incentive to reduce car use and to use alternative modes. The problem with 
the schemes allowed for under the Transport Act is that, because they deal only 
with one type of parking activity and are only to be applied in a few areas, they 
will be relatively ineffective, difficult to administer and may distort land use 
patterns. 
We also have concerns about the effect that local road charging schemes 
might have on land use patterns. The boundary effects of urban road charging 
are potentially very serious and, in the absence of an effective mechanism for 
development control, the long term effects of a localised scheme on land use 
patterns could be regrettable. Accelerated out-migration of mass activities 
from the urban core would leave a more dispersed pattern of land use and with 
transport demands which cannot easily be met by public transport. If charges 
are imposed in one area of the network but not elsewhere, the tendency will be 
for those uncharged areas to attract more of the traffic growth. But do we 
really want to see accelerated growth of traffic on suburban roads and in the 
countryside? Proponents of motorway tolls point to the fact that, without such 
tolls, the most rapid growth is likely to be on motorways and that the 
introduction of urban road pricing without commensurate tolls on peri-urban 
motorways would quickly lead to them becoming congested. Meanwhile, 
some studies (for example,  Mauchan and Bonsall, 1995) have suggested that 
the introduction of motorway tolls without any charge on local roads would 
encourage diversion to less suitable roads. It seems that any non-universal 
charging system will have undesirable effects on the uncharged network. 
The Commission for Integrated Transport’s backing of nationwide 
distance-based charges seeks to overcome this problem. Publication of the 
proposals resulted in a predictable, if largely misplaced, concern about 
personal privacy but the predicted concern about any additional tax burden on 
motorists was largely defused by the suggestion that the scheme would only be 
introduced as a replacement for other forms of motoring taxes – the net effect 
would be tax-neutral. This proposal raises some interesting issues. 
Firstly, why, other than for presentational reasons, is it designed to be tax-
neutral? Can it really be that road users already pay enough to cover the full 
social costs of their travel through annual vehicle licence fees, fuel tax, 
parking charges etc? A number of studies have attempted to quantify the full 
social costs generated by road users and to draw comparisons with taxes and 
charges paid (see for example Maddison et al., 1996). Results vary 
significantly from one study to another depending particularly on the value 
attributed to environmental externalities, but a universal finding is that urban 
drivers fail to cover their social costs, particularly during congested periods. 
Against this background we note that the traffic forecasts built into the Ten 
Year Plan assume that the real cost of motoring will fall by 20 per cent by 
2010. This reduction in cost will inevitably lead to traffic growth and, given 
the objective of reducing traffic levels, it could be argued that we should be 
seeking ways to increase, or at least, maintain the real cost of motoring. It 
follows that if underlying costs are declining, taxes should be increased.  
The second question is whether it is really necessary to introduce a 
universal system using sophisticated technology. Could not much of the 
benefit be gained more simply increasing the level of an existing tax whose 
incidence is broadly proportional to distance travelled and environmental 
damage caused – namely fuel tax? The usual objections to increased fuel taxes 
are that it would not be politically acceptable in the aftermath of the fuel tax 
protests of September 2000, that it would be unfair on rural motorists, and that 
its impact would not be sufficiently focused on congested roads.  
It cannot be denied that increased fuel tax would be unpopular; but is it 
reasonable to assume that they would be any less popular than road charges? 
Increased fuel tax would undoubtedly fall most heavily on rural motorists 
because of the longer distances they have to travel to reach local facilities and 
because of the paucity of alternative means of transport. But if the revenues 
from increased fuel tax were used to subsidise rural facilities (post offices, 
schools, local hospitals, etc.) the rural communities, and the environment, 
might be better off.  
Although fuel efficiency is below average in congested traffic, the 
proportionate increase in fuel consumption in congested conditions is not as 
great as the proportionate increase in externalities attributable to the traffic 
involved. It is therefore clear that fuel taxes can never correct for congestion-
related externalities. However, given that in practice the correction of 
congestion-related externalities will be less important than selected traffic 
reduction and effective revenue raising, a package combining increased taxes 
on fuel and levies on all parking spaces would seem to offer a possible way 
forward. The real problem is perhaps that the Transport Act does not provide 
for this! 
At the time of writing the prospect of widespread adoption of road 
charging by UK local authorities seems remote. Despite calls from the 
Commission for Integrated Transport for introduction of charging in congested 
urban areas and on motorways, the Government are sending very lukewarm 
messages on urban charging and are denying the existence of any plans for 
motorway charging. Relieved, by the funding promised under the Ten Year 
Plan, of the need to find an independent revenue stream, most local authorities 
are content to duck behind the parapet and wait the outcome of the schemes in 
London and Nottingham. This is an altogether rational position to take; why 
risk public disaffection when there is so much that can go wrong? The 
technology may fail, effective enforcement may prove impossible, the looked-
for reduction in congestion may not materialise, the associated improvement in 
public transport capacity may not prove deliverable, a future government may 
renege on the promise of additionality – quite enough here to daunt most 
politicians!   
The nightmare for proponents of road charging is that, perhaps because of 
the ambitious schedule against which has been planned, the London scheme 
will not succeed and that such a high profile failure would set back the cause 
of road charging for decades.  However, if Nottingham proves more successful 
than most people expect, and if London meets its targets, then other schemes 
are likely to follow – although there will always be those who question the 
transferability of experience in the capital city to smaller cities less well served 
by public transport and without such a uniquely competitive position.  
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